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Synthesis
The action cycle/structural context framework: a fisheries application
D.G. Webster 1
ABSTRACT. There is a growing consensus that environmental governance is a wicked problem that requires understanding of the
many linkages and feedbacks between human and natural systems. Here, I propose an action cycle/structural context (AC/SC) framework
that is based on the concept of responsive governance, in which individuals and decision makers respond to problems rather than
working to prevent them. By linking agency and structure, the AC/SC framework points out two key problems in the realm of
environmental governance: the profit disconnect, whereby economic signals of environmental harm are dampened by endogenous or
exogenous forces, and the power disconnect, whereby those who feel the costs of harm are politically marginalized and so have little
influence to effect solutions. I apply this framework to fisheries to develop hypotheses regarding exclusionary and conservation-oriented
responses under different power/profit dynamics. These expectations are tested in a historical case study of management of the lobster
fishery in Maine. The analysis confirms the importance of profit/power dynamics and reveals that governance tends to go through
effective and ineffective cycles in a management treadmill that can be driven by internal or external forces. The latter in particular are
generally ignored in fisheries management but could ultimately undermine sustainability even in previously well-managed systems.
Key Words: complexity; environmental governance; fisheries; social-ecological systems
INTRODUCTION
Ideally, environmental governance should be proactive but in
many issue areas resource users and decisions makers respond to
problems rather than preventing them. Webster (2009) calls this
responsive governance and further posits that decision makers
first select expedient policies and then try more costly measures
if  problems persist or escalate. Figure 1 is a simple overview of
this process. It starts with an environmental problem on the left-
hand side of the figure eight. As long as management remains
ineffective, the problem will cause increasing economic costs,
which in turn will generate growing political concern. As pressure
to respond increases, decision makers try new solutions until they
effectively “solve” the underlying problem, switching the system
into an effective cycle of environmental improvement. Some
systems may not switch from ineffective to effective cycles in time,
resulting in environmental catastrophe. There are also many
exogenous and endogenous factors that can alter the behavior of
the system. The action cycle/structural context (AC/SC)
framework and related profit/power dynamics presented here are
designed to improve our understanding of responsive governance
with a particular focus on factors that either speed up or delay
response.  
Using the framework described below, two major delaying factors
are clear. First, there is the profit disconnect, which occurs
whenever economic signals regarding environmental harms are
dampened. In other words, a profit disconnect occurs whenever
the economic equilibrium level of production is greater than the
sustainable level. Second, there is the power disconnect, which
occurs when those who are sensitive to the costs of environmental
damage are marginalized politically. Both disconnects change
over time because of exogenous and endogenous factors and this
can have profound effects on management. Indeed, they often
amplify each other in a reinforcing feedback loop as greater wealth
and economic importance increases the political influence of an
actor, which in turn can be used to safeguard that wealth and
forestall regulations that might limit profit seeking. The AC/SC
framework also predicts that systems will cycle back and forth
between the ineffective and effective cycles shown in Figure 1 in
what can be thought of as a management treadmill. This treadmill
can be relatively stable or it can be rapidly expanding around a
positive trend, which increases the risk of catastrophic outcomes.
THE AC/SC FRAMEWORK
There is a longstanding debate in the literature on environmental
governance between scholars who favor agency as a primary
determinant of outcomes vs. those who ascribe greater influence
to social structures. Young (2001) describes this tension as an
argument between collective action vs. social practice approaches
and finds that there is some truth in each perspective. Giddens
(1979) approached the same problem in sociology by proposing
that both agency and structure are important and that each
reinforces the other. His theory of “structuration” accepts that
actions can affect the institutional structure just as structure
affects individual and group actions. The action cycle/structural
context framework presented here was inspired by Giddens’s
theory of structuration but is founded in political economy and
also draws on work from the literature on domestic and
international governance, bioeconomics, and social-ecological or
coupled human and natural systems (Simon 1955, Downs 1972,
Newell and Simon 1972, Sprout and Sprout 1979, Higgs 1987,
Hilborn and Walters 1992, Grossman and Helpman 2001,
Baumgartner et al. 2009). As such it fits into a growing literature
on middle-path approaches to the action-structure debate in the
social sciences and policy studies more broadly (Steinberg 2012).
Furthermore, the AC/SC framework should be thought of as a
compliment rather than a substitute for existing frameworks for
understanding social ecological systems, particularly Ostrom et
al. (2007), Ostrom (2009), and Young et al. (2006). The main
difference is the responsive nature of decision making and relative
importance of temporal dynamics in the analysis.  
Although the general concept of structuration is very useful, it is
necessary to further define agency and structure in terms that are
applicable in an environmental governance setting. In particular,
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Fig. 1. Responsive governance cycles.
I associate agency with problem solving through an action cycle,
where actors choose how to respond to signals that they receive
about some underlying environmental problem. The nature of
both the individual and aggregate response depends heavily on
the structural context in which the action cycle takes place. Over
time, however, responses in the action cycle can alter the structural
context and thereby alter the behavior of the system as a whole.
Figure 2 illustrates these points by embedding the action cycle in
the structural context, indicating that action is constrained by the
structural context but that the context is itself  created by the
compounding of actions over time. There are also exogenous
forces that drive, catalyze, or limit the action cycle and which may
operate at different “speeds” than the action cycle itself, as per
the panarchy concepts put forth by Gunderson and Holling (2002;
see also Ostrom 2004, Young 2010).  
First, the action cycle consists of a problem, which generates
signals, which in turn trigger actor responses. For instance,
pollution (the problem) can cause negative health effects (the
signal) which generates political action (primary response) and,
where power favors those harmed, regulatory action will be a key
result (secondary response). Primary and secondary responses
may help to solve problems but can also simply dampen signals,
allowing problems to become worse over time; both the profit
disconnect and the power disconnect are widened by maladaptive
responses that minimize problem signals without solving the core
problem in a system. For example, many economic responses to
problem signals such as the increasing marginal cost of resource
extraction involve innovation to reduce costs of production. This
dampens the signal of economic costs but does not expand the
amount of the resource available or trigger switching to
substitutes, so the core problem continues even though the
primary problem signal is temporarily nullified by endogenous
responses. This is an example of a profit disconnect. It will persist
as long as technological change ensures that increasing costs of
production (problem signal) can be mitigated by innovation
(primary response). This persistence in turn depends heavily on
the resources available in the structural context.
Fig. 2. The action/structure framework.
As per Young (1994), governance factors in the structural context
include formal laws, regulations, and agencies, as well as informal
rules and norms governing actor behavior. Actors themselves are
also a part of the structural context because institutions
circumscribe the roles and resources available to them. Actors
may be individuals, groups, or states, depending on the case under
consideration and the needs of the researcher. Indeed, the AC/SC
framework is designed to analyze cross-level interactions, because
response at one level of analysis is often aimed at altering
responses at other levels. As in the pollution example described
above, the primary response at the individual level was to demand
Ecology and Society 20(1): 33
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss1/art33/
a secondary response from government, which could occur at the
local, regional, or national level. Secondary responses can then
feedback through the system, altering individual- or state-level
behavior. In formulating their responses, actors depend on
available resources, which include natural resources, capital goods
and finance, technological and managerial capacity, and political
power bases.[1] Where resources are limited, the responses of
actors and the operation of the system as a whole are also limited,
unless actors can find viable means of expanding the resource
base. Economic responses such as the innovation described above
often expand one type of resource (technology) through use of a
different type of resource (capital).  
All of the above factors are considered to be endogenous to the
AC/SC system. However, there are other factors that affect the
action cycle or alter the structural context and change the speed
of response exogenously (Mitchell 1994, Young 2010). These
generally fall into two major categories: limits and drivers. The
latter can be further broken down into direct drivers and catalysts
of change. Exogenous limits are forces that slow or stop the action
cycle. They may be related to governance, economics, or natural
systems and include institutional interplay, macroeconomic
policies, and biophysical factors such as finite reserves of
nonrenewable resources and replenishment rates in renewable
resources. Ecosystem effects in particular are important limits
when dealing with living resources like fish and other marine
fauna. Exogenous drivers are forces that increase the speed and
intensity of the action cycle. Like limits, these drivers can be
related to governance, as when governments choose to subsidize
economic development, economics, as when economic
development drives increasing production, or the environment,
as when changes in oceanographic conditions improve the
productivity of a stock of fish. Technological innovation that is
not associated with the action cycle directly but is appropriated
by actors can also catalyze change. Sometimes, these shifts
mitigate the underlying problem but more often technology drives
expansion by reducing the costs of production.  
Both endogenous and exogenous factors have some impact on the
timing of transitions from the ineffective to the effective cycles
shown in Figure 1. The timing of the switching response is
different from the speed of the action cycle. Speeding up the action
cycle means that problems worsen more quickly than they would
otherwise, so that problem signals should escalate faster. This can
generate response that occurs earlier in time but actually later
relative to underlying problems. That is, with a faster action cycle,
switching from the ineffective to effective cycles in Figure 1 will
occur when problems are worse than in a slower action cycle, even
though there is less time between the initiation of the problem
and the implementation of a viable solution. Speeding up the
switching response entails ensuring that solutions are in place
when problems are relatively small and manageable. Thus, in a
system where the action cycle is slow, for instance, in a small
artisanal mining operation, effective response may occur after
many years of exploitation but still be earlier than a case where
switching occurs after 1-2 years but exploitation is undertaken by
large industrial corporations. In the latter case, the amount of
pollution or degradation that occurs in the ineffective portion of
the action cycle is greater than the former case, even though the
period of ineffective management is much shorter.  
Both the profit and power disconnects delay switching responses
by dampening problem signals and the political will to solve core
problems. Within the action cycle, as per Webster (2009) it is
assumed that decision makers, those actors who control the rules
and norms related to the core problem, generally prefer expedient
responses and so engage in trial and error or responsive
governance as described above (Downs 1972, Ludwig et al. 1993).
Political expedience depends on (1) the costs and benefits of policy
options, which shape political demands for or lobbying against
government response, (2) the relative political influence of actor
groups, which determines their ability to impact government
response, and (3) the goals of the decision making body, which
impacts interest group influence and can generate exogenous
changes in government response. Policy options that provide
benefits to all actor groups are highly expedient and should be
fairly easy to implement as long as they do not conflict with the
goals of the decision making body, e.g., undermine their power
base. In contrast, policy options that are costly to one or more
groups will only be expedient if  negatively affected groups have
little political influence. Where groups with competing interests
are equally powerful, there are few expedient outcomes and
stalemate is a frequent response. As long as problem signals are
low, only expedient management measures will be adopted when
power is evenly distibuted.  
It is also important to remember that expedient measures are often
ineffective and may even speed up the action cycle. In such cases,
core problems should persist or worsen, generating increasing
political will to adopt less expedient solutions. Indeed, where
relatively effective management measures are politically costly,
there will be considerable delay in the transition from ineffective
to effective management shown in Figure 1. Exogenous factors
can also delay the switching response, particularly if  they increase
either the profit disconnect or the power disconnect. For instance,
an exogenous increase in demand for a specific type of product
can cause an increase in price that would counter the economic
costs associated with higher levels of quantity supplied due to
innovation. Alternately, shifts in the governance system, for
instance from a democracy to an authoritarian system or even
simply changes in laws that favor privileged groups can widen the
power disconnect, allowing greater resource appropriation by
outsider elites who have little incentive to sustain the resource
base or invest in the local economy. Exogenous factors that speed
up the action cycle can also destabilize response, because
individuals and decision makers have less time for the trial and
error process of responsive governance. This temporal disconnect
magnifies most problems in environmental governance, including
the profit and power disconnects.  
Although there are many factors that delay or destabilize
responsive governance, there are also forces that can speed up
response relative to the severity of underlying problems. Within
the action cycle, any process that narrows the profit disconnect
will probably cause response to occur when the environmental
problems are smaller and economic costs are lower. When
economic signals clearly reflect underlying problems, we can
expect exit from an industry and switching to substitutes. These
primary responses reduce problems like resource degradation and
pollution but are uncommon because so many strategies are
available to avoid profit signals. Political will for regulation should
also increase sooner when the profit disconnect is narrow,
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although the effects of this dynamic are heavily dependent on the
structural context as described above. Similarly, factors that
narrow the power disconnect can generate earlier political
response when there is sufficient overlap between actor goals and
values. However, empowering sensitive actors can also cause
political deadlock, further delaying response. Thus, structural
shifts can also affect the timing of switching response.  
Endogenously, political responses in the action cycle can alter the
structural context by changing actor roles, available resources,
and governance. This process is often called institutionalization.
It can speed up response to similar problems in later time periods
and even in related issue areas. Ostrom (1990) and many others
describe this process in collective action settings. In formal
governance settings, the formation of institutions or agencies
modifies the governance mechanisms that circumscribe the
system (Higgs 1987, Pierson 2000). For instance, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency was created in part as a
response to several well-publicized pollution crises but it was not
disbanded once those problems were solved. Rather, it remains
as a key component of pollution regulation in the United States.
The institutionalization of response is not always beneficial;
maladaptive responses can be institutionalized. However, it does
provide an avenue to increase the speed and effectiveness of
response through changes in the structural context. As per Young
(2002), exogenous forces can have similar effects on the speed of
response, particularly when a response in one issue area alters
governance institutions or increases management responses more
broadly. This can occur as vertical interplay when effects cross
levels of analysis (i.e., when a major problem at the local level
engenders national-level change in regulations) or horizontal
interplay when effects occur at the same level of analysis (i.e.,
when a new regulatory option is developed in one location but
then is adopted elsewhere because of its perceived success).  
The AC/SC framework can be used as a deductive or inductive
tool. It can guide descriptive analysis in an iterative process that
starts with the definition of the core problem(s) and identification
of the time period covered by the analysis. Usually, analysis should
start with the beginning of human activities that generate the core
problem. For instance, if  a certain type of pollution is the core
problem then the analysis would start with the development of
the technology that generates this pollution or its introduction
into a new area. The analyst then describes the various factors in
the structural context and action cycle at the start point, along
with any exogenous limits or drivers. Process tracing can then be
used to document changes in the action cycle, its effects on the
structural context, feedbacks between action and structure, and
the overall system-level capacity for responsive governance.
Throughout, exogenous factors should be monitored in case
changes in these variables cause shifts in the system. Webster
(2015) uses this approach to understand the evolution of global
fisheries management generally.  
Inductively, the AC/SC framework can also be used to formulate
testable hypotheses regarding responsive behaviors. These can be
aimed at specific levels of analysis or the working of the system
as a whole. For instance, responsive governance itself  can be tested
qualitatively or quantitatively by collecting and comparing data
on the temporal paths of the core problem and shifts in
governance. The expectation would be that that governance does
not occur prior to environmental problems, even in cases where
institutions are well established and ample warning is provided
by scientists or other actors. A corollary here is that, when
response occurs, we would expect that more expedient measures
are undertaken first and less expedient measures are only tried if
problems persist. Webster (2009) uses this approach based on a
much simpler framework. Similarly, the management treadmill is
an extension of the responsive governance assumption and can
be tested by determining whether or not governance does indeed
transition between periods of greater and lesser effectiveness,
either for the same specific problem or for different variations on
the core problem. Alternately, one can develop hypotheses
regarding interactions between framework components, such as
how the structural context or exogenous forces affect signal
reception and response choice within the action cycle, as described
below.
AC/SC APPLICATION TO FISHERIES
The action cycle for most marine fisheries is dominated by the
common pool resource problem (Ostrom 1990, Barkin and
Shambaugh 1999). That is, because marine living resources are
both open access and rival, fishers have strong incentives to take
as many organisms (“fish” from here on out) as possible before
they are harvested by others. This leads to the classic problems of
overfishing, where effort is greater than that which would support
maximum sustainable yield (or ecologically sustainable yield for
that matter), and overcapitalization, where investment in effort is
greater than the economically optimum level. Although both of
these outcomes are undesirable from biological or economic
perspectives, both may be limited by the profit signal, in which
profits decline with increased supply and decreased biomass. All
else equal, this dynamic should cause effort to increase until the
system eventually reaches an equilibrium where total revenue =
total cost and there is no longer incentive to increase effort (Clark
2005). In the language of the AC/SC framework, the profit signal
is the primary endogenous determinant of actor response and,
under open access, we generally expect a substantial profit
disconnect. The profit signal can further be divided between the
cost signal, which occurs when costs of production increase
because of declining biomass, and the price signal, which occurs
when prices decline with large increases in harvests (assuming the
fishery is large relative to the market).  
As shown below, the ceterus paribus or all else equal assumption
does not often hold in commercial fisheries and the profit signal
is frequently obscured as endogenous and exogenous factors
widen the profit disconnect by causing the economic equilibrium
level of production to shift out without increasing biological
productivity. Endogenously, the fishing industry itself  often
responds to lower profits by investing in innovation to reduce
costs and/or drive up demand, thereby keeping profits high in
spite of declining biomass and increasing supplies of fish
products. The cost signal associated with declining biomass can
be mitigated through exploration and technological innovation,
both of which increase resources available in the structural context
and dampen incentives to reduce effort regardless of the property
rights regime (Squires et al. 2008, Squires and Vestergaard 2013).
These types of responses can cause massive increases in
production, which would drive prices down if  the all else equal
assumption holds. However, fishers and other industry actors
frequently counter this price signal by working to expand markets,
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generating growth in demand to match or exceed growth in supply.
Without these primary economic responses and related
dampening of regulatory response the fishing industry could not
be as large and widespread as it is today.  
When governance is included in the analysis, the AC/SC
framework highlights different problems, signals, and
disconnects. First, conflict over access rights is a political problem
that is often ignored in economic theory related to fisheries but
is a major driver of early response through the establishment of
endowments and entitlements (Ostrom et al. 1994). Historically,
many fishing communities managed their local stocks through
allocation of use rights, defending “their” fisheries with physical
violence when necessary. In modern times, because open access
is the dominant norm, fishers frequently use conservation as a
pretext when they lobby for exclusionary regulations that force
outsider groups of fishers to reduce their effort without negatively
impacting insider groups. Gear restrictions and time area closures
as well as quota schemes can all be used as indirect exclusionary
tactics.  
In contrast, environmental interest groups and recreational
fishers are political groups that tend to respond to biological
signals as interpreted by scientists and the media, though their
response also escalates with the core problem and so may not be
very strong until a stock is severely depleted. These groups often
prefer stringent conservation measures that impose high costs on
fishers and the industry as a whole. This can lead to strong
ideological backlash by industry and the resulting conflict
between powerful interests often results in regulatory inaction due
to political stalemate. However, if  the costs of overfishing increase
with delayed response then increasing political will to find
solutions can foster coalition formation and the eventual
implementation of more effective management measures,
switching the system to the right-hand side of Figure 1 (DeSombre
1995). Alternately, when powerful industry groups are insulated
from costs by the profit disconnect, then coalition formation is
unlikely and collapse is an expected result unless conservation
groups can leverage public support (in democracies) or other
sources of political power.  
Decision makers themselves are actors in the AC/SC framework.
They have their own goals and resources. Maintaining or
increasing their political power and economic resources is a
common goal for decision makers. It can be driven by personal
greed or by the desire to increase problem-solving capacities.
Other goals that are related to fisheries include conflict
prevention, food security, economic development, and
employment as well as sustainable management. In fact,
conservation is a relatively new goal for government decision
makers in the fisheries arena; government regulation to maximize
the short-run socioeconomic benefits of fishing has a much longer
history. Most of these goals can be met in the short run by the
economic expansion of the fishing industry, and so early
governance responses in industrialized fisheries feature policies
such as subsidies and size limits, gear restrictions, or other
expedient regulations that are supposed to provide some
conservation without substantial negative effects on total catch
and related economic benefits. In many areas around the world,
decision makers also responded to conflicts among fishers by
establishing access rights and judicial processes. Well-enforced
measures like catch limits are usually the least expedient policies
and so are only adopted when both the profit disconnect and the
power disconnect are small due to widespread overexploitation,
lack of economic responses that mitigate the profit signal, and
exogenous factors as described below.  
Hypotheses derived from the above analysis are summarized in
Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 describes broad response expectations
depending on the state of the profit disconnect and the
distribution of power among key actor groups. When the profit
disconnect is narrow, fishers are sensitive to bioeconomic problem
signals, so if  they are the most powerful interest group(s) then the
power disconnect is narrow (row 1). On the other hand, if  the
profit disconnect is wide and fishers are the only powerful actors
(row 5), then the power disconnect is also wide; thus the two
disconnects are positively correlated if  noncommercial interest
groups and exogenous forces are not included in the analysis.
However, the nature of response in either situation depends
heavily on the distribution of influence between groups of fishers
and so will be discussed in greater detail in the description of
Figure 4.  
When noncommercial interest groups are able to monopolize
power in the structural context, then we can expect substantial
limits on commercial fishing, including complete bans, and fairly
rapid establishment of “genuine” conservation regulations that
are at minimum well enforced and designed according to scientific
advice. I use the term “rapid” instead of "“early” because it is rare
for noncommercial interests to have significant political influence
early in the action cycle, particularly not the monopoly on power
described in this ideal-type. Usually biological problem signals
must be quite strong for them to harness the power of the public
as a latent interest group (Olson 1971). All else equal, when the
profit disconnect is narrow, and fishers are also sensitive to
bioeconomic problem signals (row 2), this response is likely to
generate switching from ineffective to effective management cycles
as shown in Figure 1. The International Whaling Commission
from the late 1970s to the 1990s is probably the best-known
example of this profit/power dynamic. However, if  the profit
disconnect is wide or increasing (row 6), then there are substantial
incentives to fish in contravention of limits and conservation
regulations, so we can expect wide-spread noncompliance by the
fishing industry. There are many examples of this behavior in the
area of charismatic megafauna generally, including widespread
illegal trade in sea turtle products, shark fins, and multiple
endangered species of coral (INTERPOL 2013).  
Cases where noncommercial interests are able to monopolize
power are rare throughout the history of fisheries management,
particularly in marine systems. More often, fishers are the primary
interest group(s) until stocks are severely depleted, triggering
strong action by noncommercial interest groups. In such cases,
both commercial and noncommercial interest can wield
considerable influence. This always causes initial conflict, largely
because noncommercial interests usually call for drastic limits on
fishing effort, which threatens fishers’ livelihoods. If  the profit
disconnect is narrow (row 3) then this period of conflict may be
quite short, causing only a short delay in conservation-oriented
management. A caveat on this response is that conflict over access
rights among fishers can delay response regardless of the profit
disconnect (see discussion of fig. 4). If  the profit disconnect is
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Fig. 3. General power/profit dynamics.
Fig. 4. Predicted responses when fishers are the only powerful
actors.
wide (row 7), then prolonged conflict will probably delay a genuine
conservation response, although it is likely that governments will
adopt some weak measures to placate both sides. Even when
stronger measures are in place, high levels of noncompliance can
be expected because incentives to cheat are high as long as the
profit disconnect is wide. Management of Atlantic bluefin tuna
is a good example in this category (Webster 2011).  
Last, for Figure 3, it is important to note that exogenous interest
groups, either from other fisheries or completely unrelated to
fisheries, may have considerable control over regulation in a given
fishery. For example, issues like security, oil production, or trade
and commerce take precedence over fishing in many parts of the
world. Similarly, formal and informal hierarchies can marginalize
fishers politically even when they are profitable economically. In
such cases the power disconnect is always wide, because
exogenous groups do not receive problem signals from fisheries
at all. Nevertheless, the impact of these groups can be substantial.
In general, we expect that fishing will be prohibited in any areas
where there are conflicts with exogenous uses, such as near ports,
beaches, or oil rigs. Otherwise, conservation is not likely to occur
formally, though when the profit disconnect is narrow (row 4)
fishers may develop informal sharing arrangements among
themselves (again, see discussion of Figure 4). Alternately, if  the
profit disconnect is wide (row 8), then wide-spread
noncompliance with these limits can be expected and it is likely
that severe depletion will result, particularly outside of conflicted
areas.  
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Figure 4 provides greater detail on fisheries where commercial
fishers are the only powerful interest groups. It outlines expected
responses given the combined power/profit disconnect (columns)
and distribution of influence among groups of fishers (rows).
Rows are further divided into response to conflict signals (top)
and response to profit signals (bottom). In general, conflict signals
are expected to occur earlier than profit signals and so conflict
responses can be expected to precede profit responses, although
token conservation measures that are not likely to have much
effect on the stock or the fishery may be adopted fairly early. All
else equal, when both the profit disconnect and the power
disconnect are narrow and influence is uniformly distributed (box
1, upper left), the primary conflict response is collective action
and we can expect relatively early conservation response to
bioeconomic problem signals. More specifically, collective action
will involve exclusion of outsiders to prevent entry and
distribution of access rights to reduce conflict among existing
resource users. Similarly, because those with power are sensitive
to bioeconomic problem signals, relatively early conservation
response is expected. That is, governance will still be responsive
but actors will press for conservation soon after problem signals
start and will agree on measures before substantial biological
depletion sets in. Conflict over access may delay conservation
somewhat but is less likely than in other categories because all
fishers are equally affected by the narrow profit disconnect.  
Alternately, when the profit/power disconnects are wide and
power is distributed uniformly among groups of fishers (box 2,
upper right), prolonged conflict is likely because bioeconomic
signals are delayed and no groups are able to exclude others. Two
exceptions are rules excluding outsiders (who usually wield little
political power) and token conservation measures as described
above. Otherwise, groups of fishers will not be able to agree on
access rights or genuine conservation measures until bioeconomic
problem signals are experienced, and because the profit
disconnect is wide this will substantially delay both types of
response. Interestingly, conservation-oriented response is also
likely to be delayed when the profit/power disconnects are narrow
and distribution of power is asymmetrical (box 3, lower left) but
for different reasons. Here, less powerful groups of fishers will be
excluded fairly early in the action cycle because there are strong
bioeconomic problem signals. Hypothetically, remaining groups
should then be able to negotiate conservation measures as in box
1, but this rarely happens. On the one hand, remaining groups
often overestimate the “room to grow” created by exclusion, so
overcapitalization ratchets up quickly, making conservation more
difficult. On the other hand, the process of excluding week actors
tends to undermine the legitimacy of management generally and
can prolong conflict among remaining actors in spite of strong
bioeconomic problem signals.  
Last, for Figure 4, when the power/profit disconnects are wide
and influence is distributed asymmetrically (box 4, lower right)
prolonged conflict and severely delayed management response is
expected. In such cases there are usually strong reinforcing
feedbacks between profit and power that constantly increase the
profitability and political power of capital-rich members of the
fishing industry while further marginalizing less wealthy and more
vulnerable fishers. Counterintuitively, political exclusion tends to
be delayed in these cases because powerful actors are not
threatened by less powerful groups economically. Large industrial
fisheries corporations may even avoid exclusionary regulation
because it might set a precedent that could limit their future
growth. On the other hand, smaller scale fishers may lobby to
exclude large-scale fleets but because they lack political power
their efforts will not result in exclusionary regulation.[2] As with
box 2, because bioeconomic problem signals are delayed by the
wide profit disconnect, we can expect delayed conservation in this
category. However, because of the reinforcing feedback loop
noted above, the profit disconnect is increasing, which constantly
pushes the equilibrium level of effort farther from the sustainable
level and creates a prolonged period when bioeconomic problem
signals are dampened for politically powerful actors. Because of
this, conservation response will be severely delayed and may not
occur until the fishery actually collapses, either economically or
biologically.  
In addition to the ideal-types shown in Figures 3 and 4, the AC/
SC framework points out two other sets of factors that can affect
the timing of governance response in fisheries. First, within the
four boxes shown in Figure 4, any component in the structural
context that increases the expedience of relatively effective
measures can improve the speed of conservation response and
vice versa. These factors include development of expedient yet
effective management measures (resources), strong leadership
(actors), and legitimate institutions (governance). Most of these
factors are already well-understood in the literature. However,
they do not over-ride the expectations developed in Figures 3 and
4. Rather, these factors fine-tune response within each category.
That is, when both disconnects are narrow, we still expect early
conservation response but it will occur sooner with a conducive
structural context and slightly later with a prohibitive structural
context. Similarly, when either disconnect is wide, conservation
response will still be delayed more than in cases where both
disconnects are narrow, but the length of delay will vary based
on the favorability of the structural context. When both
disconnects are wide even a highly favorable structural context
will have little impact and, indeed, we can expect to see
deterioration in certain factors such as leadership and legitimacy
as conflict and contestation undermine confidence in the system.
Thus structure affects action but action also impacts structure.  
Second, any factors that alter either the profit disconnect or the
power disconnect can switch a system from one category to
another and thereby alter response. Endogenously, entrepreneurial
behavior by fishers and others in the fishing industry tends to
reduce costs of production, expand sources of revenue to multiple
stocks or fishing grounds, and increase market demand for fish
products. Indeed, the industry is adept at minimizing both cost
and price signals, which widens the profit disconnect and can shift
a system from the left to the right-hand side of Figure 4.
Interestingly, capital agglomeration can lead to a shift in the power
disconnect as greater production is associated with increased
influence in terms of food supply, employment, lobbying,
campaign contributions, and other factors that can sway decision
makers. Industry demands for supporting subsidies or other
expansionary measures can amplify the positive feedback
between the profit disconnect and the power disconnect as well.
In contrast, regulations that limit ownership and exclude large
corporate fishing interests can help to maintain a narrow profit
Ecology and Society 20(1): 33
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss1/art33/
disconnect. These most often emerge in pluralist systems where
small-scale fishers can utilize the power of numbers to influence
government policy.  
There are several exogenous drivers that can shift a system from
one category to another in the Figures. Population growth and
economic development both generate increasing demand that
allows prices to remain high on average in spite of increases in
supply, dampening the price signal and widening the profit
disconnect (Sumaila et al. 2007). Globalization and technological
innovation catalyze lower costs of production, dampening the
cost signal (Squires and Vestergaard 2013). On the other hand,
macroeconomic factors like economic recession can narrow the
profit disconnect by causing prices to drop. This in turn can
generate considerable political will for improved management
regardless of the biological state of a fishery. Politically,
recessions, war, and similar disturbances can exogenously drive
governments to create subsidies to develop new fisheries to ensure
food security and economic growth rather than as an endogenous
response to fisher lobbying (Royce 1987, Clark et al. 2005, Sumaila
et al. 2010). Similarly, when fisheries are seen as a source of wealth,
governments or states may seek control over fisheries resources,
reducing direct competition for their domestic fleets independent
of fisher demands for protection (Fulton 1911, Juda 1996).
Ultimately, any change in the governance structure that increases
the political power of sensitive actors will reduce the power
disconnect while factors that marginalize sensitive groups widen
the power disconnect.
CASE STUDY: MAINE LOBSTER GOVERNANCE
The case of the Maine Lobster fishery was selected for several
reasons. First, it is relatively simple, with little involvement of
noncommercial interest groups, so the focus can be on the
expectations put forward in Figure 4. Although it is important to
test all of the implications of the AC/SC framework described in
Figure 3, space constraints limit the analysis. Here, the main
purpose is to show how the expectations above can be tested,
rather than test all of them. That said, the second reason the
Maine lobster fishery was selected was because all four of the
major ideal-types presented in Figure 4 are represented at different
periods in its history. Third, many of the most common
endogenous or exogenous forces that can shift fisheries from one
category to another are demonstrated in this case. Fourth, as one
of the most well-studied cases of environmental governance, the
Maine lobster fishery provides a test of the value added of the
AC/SC framework generally and the hypothetical profit/power
dynamics derived from it. I argue that this approach is more
generalizable than existing explanations of governance in these
fisheries and that it provides a unified perspective that
encompasses the pre-existing literature rather than replacing it.
Furthermore, the framework explains stability as well as change,
providing the theoretical groundwork for expectations of periods
of delay as well as periods of response.  
The approach used here is qualitative, partly because long time
series of quantitative measures are not available for all of the key
variables, especially the profit and power disconnects, and partly
because a focus on detail is appropriate at this stage of theory
development. In the analysis, I use the academic literature
augmented with contemporary news articles, market reports, and
government documents to trace changes in the profit disconnect
and the power disconnect over time. This allows me to break each
case down into time periods that match up with the different
categories in Figure 3 and also to identify the various factors that
drive switching from one category to another. Once the periods
are classified, I test whether or not governance fits the
expectations derived from the AC/SC framework given the
relevant profit/power dynamics as described above. This is also a
test of the existence of responsive governance generally, because
it traces the action cycle and shows how response changes over
time in each period.  
Although widely viewed as a great success in terms of both
collective action and government regulation, in reality the lobster
fishery of Maine cycled through several periods of
overexploitation and rebuilding. These cycles were shaped by
economic, political, and biological forces and each engendered a
different process of response depending on the profit/power
dynamics of the period. As with most fisheries, the Maine lobster
fishery started out with a narrow, or even negative, profit
disconnect and equally narrow power disconnect. This changed
over time as first canneries and then dealers in fresh lobster
injected capital into the fishery, widening both disconnects, at
least temporarily. Exogenous forces also came into play as
increasing or decreasing demand had profound effects on
management, as did influxes of new fishers when managers
reduced access to other fisheries, including the New England
groundfish fishery. Thus, both conflict and profit signals were at
play during different phases in this history of this fishery.
1800 to early 1840s
The commercial fishery for lobster in Maine started at the
beginning of the 19th century. Although lobster were plentiful,
methods of capture were rudimentary and preservation
technologies limited markets, so there was a narrow or even
negative profit disconnect in the early 1800s. The introduction of
the welled smack-a vessel that could carry live lobsters to ports
like Boston increased the equilibrium level of production but the
profit disconnect remained narrow until the growth of canneries
in the 1840s. Lobstermen, too, were primarily of the same social
class and, although there were certainly hierarchies within
communities, the power disconnect was narrow because all were
equally affected by changes in the fishery (Formisano 1997). Thus,
for its first 40 years the Maine lobster fishery fit in the top left
hand box in Figure 3 and we would expect to see collective action
to exclude outsiders and share the resource among insiders, as
well as early conservation if  any such measures were even
necessary given the level of exploitation and capitalization in the
fishery.  
Analysis of formal governance fits these expectations. With the
introduction of welled smacks, fishers from New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and even Canada started harvesting lobster in the
Gulf of Maine. This angered local fishers who lobbied for
exclusionary regulations in the 1820s. In 1828, the Maine
legislature passed a law prohibiting landing of lobster by out-of-
state vessels, effectively closing off  the fishery to outsiders.
Informal governance is more difficult to analyze because there
are few written records of it from the period. Given the rapid
growth that started with the introduction of smacks, it is possible
that conflict between increasing numbers of fishers led to
establishment of what Acheson (1975) refers to as perimeter-
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defended territories, where groups of lobstermen established well-
defined boundaries to fishing territories near their home ports.
Certainly, Acheson notes that these types of territories were most
prevalent prior to 1920. Nevertheless, I could not find written
evidence of such access rights in the early 1800s, and so can only
speculate. In contrast, a number of sources describe vast
quantities of lobsters and high profits in the fishery, so without
either catch or profit signals, we do not expect early conservation-
oriented regulations and none are observed in the historical
record. Thus, this period is a fair match for the expectations
presented in Figure 4.
1840s through early 1870s
The first cannery for lobster opened in Maine in 1842 and the
industry grew rapidly thereafter, peaking around 1865 (Cobb
1899). This generated growth in both the profit disconnect and
the power disconnect. First, canning opened up inland and
international markets for lobster, which were growing because of
both population growth and economic growth associated with
industrialization in Europe and North America. Demand for
fresh lobster was also increasing during most of the period,
though at a slower rate, so there was also a profit disconnect in
that fishery as well. Second, the influence of canneries grew in
parallel to their economic growth. Both employment and food
security were important issues at the time, in Maine and elsewhere,
so the shore-based employment and high levels of production
were desired by decision makers. Moreover, canners were fewer
in number than fishers, with close network ties, making it easier
for them to organize to lobby the Maine legislature. Because
canners preferred small lobster while fresh lobster markets
required large lobster, canners were less sensitive to the effects of
overfishing, which were mainly signaled through a decline in the
average size of lobsters found in the Gulf of Maine (Acheson
1997). Thus, the power disconnect was wider in this period than
previously, though not as wide as in other fisheries. Given that
both disconnects were increasing and the distribution of power
was asymmetrical, the fishery fits within the lower right-hand box
in Figure 4 and we would expect that all response would be delayed
but that canneries would work to exclude the fresh lobster industry
once bioeconomic problem signals started. Conservation is not
expected to occur until bioeconomic crisis is experience by the
more powerful actor group (canneries).  
Landings in both the fresh and canned fisheries increased
substantially over this period and biological signals of overfishing
started in the 1860s, because lobsters were noticeably less plentiful
in near-shore areas and the average size of landed lobsters
declined substantially (there is also selection bias here, as canners
preferred small lobsters). By the 1870s, lobstermen, canners, and
government officials all expressed concern regarding declining
lobster catches and increasing conflict over the diminished
resources by cannery and fresh lobster interest groups (Cobb
1899, Acheson 1997). In 1872, the legislature did take some
conservation action by banning harvests of female lobsters
carrying eggs. This was an expedient measure because it was
popular with all sides and was not enforced or followed. However,
canneries also lobbied for indirect exclusionary measures against
the growing fishery supplying the fresh lobster trade. Although
this fishery was small relative to canning in the 1850s and 1860s,
it started growing rapidly in the 1870s as new transportation
technologies allowed for the expansion of markets to areas far
from fishing grounds. Because of this increasing competition,
canneries started to loose profits. Responding to both economic
and political problem signals, the canneries lobbied the Maine
government for exclusionary regulation toward the end of the
period. They were eventually successful and in 1874 the Maine
legislature passed a bill that set a maximum size for lobsters from
fall through spring (Acheson 1997).  
Although the 1874 regulations may sound like conservation
measures to an outsider, it is important to note that lobster was
only canned in the summer months and that the canneries
preferred small lobsters that were not yet reproductively mature.
In contrast, lobstermen who supplied fresh markets worked year
round and received the highest prices for larger lobsters (Acheson
1997). Thus, the 1874 regulations are clearly exclusionary
management measures that were designed to force fresh lobster
fishers out of the fishery while having almost no effect on the
canneries. Again, the economic effects of biological depletion
were part of the driver behind the political demand for
management but the canneries’ political response to the perceived
economic threat from the growing freshwater fishery was also
important. However, although canneries were able to convince
decision makers to pass exclusionary regulations, enforcement
was lax and the exclusionary result was minimal. Lack of
enforcement was partly due to the low levels of managerial
resources available at the time but was also politically expedient,
allowing for legal placation of the canneries without inciting
violent protest from other lobster fishers or the markets that they
supplied.
Late 1870s to 1880s
As demand increased with expanding markets, the fresh lobster
fishery continued to grow throughout the 1870s and 1880s,
reversing the distribution of profits and power. Whereas there
were only 6 smacks transporting fresh lobster from Maine to
Boston and New York in 1853, there were 58 by 1880 and 76 by
1898, including 17 that were steam powered rather than sail (Cobb
1899). In contrast, by 1880 the number of operating canneries
fluctuated substantially with the size of the lobster harvest and
many were already out of business. Declines continued in
subsequent decades, until only 11 canneries still operated in 1902
(Cobb 1899). Thus, the profit disconnect was increasing for the
fresh lobster industry but decreasing for the canneries. The power
disconnect also shifted in this period. With growing numbers and
substantial incentive to accept the transaction costs of
organization, lobstermen and dealers who sold fresh lobsters
organized to lobby for major changes in the 1872 legislation. They
also mobilized the public against the canneries by highlighting
the “wastefulness” of canning (Acheson and Gardner 2010). Note
that this change in the distribution of political influence did not
actually narrow the power disconnect. By this time canneries were
more sensitive to bioeconomic problem signals than fishers
targeting fresh lobster because of declining prices for canned
lobster, but they were much less powerful. Thus, the fishery
remained in the lower right corner of Figure 4 but in this period
we expect the more powerful group (the fresh lobster industry) to
exclude the less powerful, the canners. Conservation measures are
still expected to be severely delayed.  
Indeed, the industry supplying fresh lobster worked for a decade
to reverse the 1872 legislation and finally won a sea change in
Ecology and Society 20(1): 33
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss1/art33/
regulations that effectively excluded cannery lobstermen from the
fishery in the 1880s. Here again, the official rationale for the new
legislation was conservation but the actual impact of the new
minimum size limit was to formally outlaw capture of lobsters of
exactly the size preferred by canneries, indeed, the size that they
needed to keep operating costs low enough to make a profit. Many
blame these regulations for the demise of the canneries, though
changes in demand played a role as well. Consumers reduced
purchases of canned lobster as relatively cheap fresh lobsters
became available. This “trickled” through the system and, by the
1880s, lobstermen could make much more money supplying fresh
markets, so declines in the supply of lobster to canneries
compounded the economic difficulties associated with decreasing
demand. In the end, canneries could not survive both economic
pressures and exclusionary regulations; they closed down while
the fishery for fresh lobster continues to this day. There were no
other attempts at conservation regulations in this period, so the
evidence fits the expectations (Acheson 1997).
Late 1880s to late 1920s
Interestingly, with the exit of the canneries, power was distributed
much more uniformly starting in the 1890s because only the fresh
lobster industry remained. During this period, fishers had no one
to exclude but themselves. On the other hand, the profit
disconnect continued to widen, causing the power disconnect to
escalate as well. With the exception of a short recession after
World War I, prices for fresh Maine lobster increased while costs
of production declined in spite of lower stock sizes due to
technological advances, particularly the introduction of steam
and then gas powered vessels around the turn of the century.
Therefore, in this period the fishery fits in the upper right box in
Figure 4, where the profit/power disconnects are wide/increasing
but the distribution of power is uniform. Given this, we expect to
see prolonged conflict over access rights and delayed conservation
response until bio economic problem signals are felt within the
industry.  
Here again, expectations derived from the AC/SC framework are
met by observed behavior. Scientists increasingly warned that the
lobster stock was overexploited throughout this period and there
was much debate regarding management. There was considerable
path dependence as this debate focused largely on shifting the
existing size limit. In 1907, the Maine legislature adopted a new
size limit that was at once too high to allow fishers to harvest the
highest-priced lobsters and too low to protect egg-bearing
females. This compromise legislation was also not well enforced,
so it fits the expedient but ineffective response that is expected
when the profit disconnect is increasing and profit signals are
weak. The size limit was changed again in 1919 but was still
ineffective. Furthermore, those regulations that existed were
blatantly violated by lobstermen throughout Maine (Acheson
1997).  
Government-funded propagation of lobster through “seeding
programs” was also popular in this period. Experimental attempts
at seeding, or raising lobster fry in hatcheries and then setting
them free in nursery areas along the coast started in the 1860s but
took off  after large-scale implementation at the Woods Hole
Marine Laboratory in 1885. If  it worked, this type of intervention
would be expansionary because it would increase the size of the
lobster stock. Interestingly, the hatchery program itself  started a
market for berried lobsters, which were sold to the U.S. Fish
Commission for use in its hatcheries. Even here, exclusion was
important and the Maine Legislature negotiated with the Federal
Government to ensure that the vast majority of fry produced from
Maine lobsters would return to Maine (Cobb 1899). However,
“seeding” of marine species, including lobster, is not effective and
eventually the program was shut down for lack of results
(Commissioners on Fish and Game 1911). Nevertheless,
government purchases of berried lobsters continued and in 1917
the Maine Legislature formally approved the practice of paying
the operators of lobster “pounds” (large pens where lobster were
held alive to smooth out seasonal fluctuations in supply), for their
berried females. Note that this was during a brief  recession in the
fishery and so is in itself  an expansionary response to narrowing
of the profit disconnect. It was certainly much more expedient
than enforcing the 1972 law banning harvests of berried lobster.
It also started the practice of marking these lobsters with a hole
in their tails and banning harvests of marked lobster (Acheson
and Gardner 2011). This more conservation-oriented aspect of
the 1917 program was not enforced and no other conservation
measures were adopted during the period in spite of frequent
warnings regarding the state of the stock from scientists. This
continued as long as rising prices and improving technologies
ensured that lobstermen could profit in spite of stock declines.
Late 1920s to World War II
Response remained conflicted and ineffective until a sudden
exogenous change, the Great Depression, shifted the fishery back
into the top left box in Figure 4, where both the profit and the
power disconnect are narrow. During the depression, few people
could afford an expensive commodity like fresh lobster, so
demand declined precipitously. Because stocks were already
heavily overexploited and the fishery was deeply overcapitalized,
there was no way for lobstermen to avoid the economic impacts
of this sudden change and profit signals spiked sharply. Given
these changes and the existence of established local access rights,
we expect that fishers would seek exclusion of outsiders and
expansionary measures first but would quickly push for genuine
conservation measures if  these attempts failed to solve the core
problems, in this case heavy overexploitation of the stock,
overcapitalization of the fishery, and exceptionally low prices.  
Interestingly, this was a period of substantial cooperation
between the industry and government. The Maine Fish
Commission, under the leadership of Horatio Crie, who first
became a fish commissioner after a 1917 law that put in place a
tripartite leadership system, worked with the industry to
accomplish two goals in the 1930s: increase demand through a
major advertising campaign and reduce supply by seeking tariffs
on lobster imports from Canada. Hypothetically, these politically
expedient measures (one expansionary, the second exclusionary)
could bring prices back up without reducing harvests. However,
demand did not increase with the new marketing campaigns and
the Maine delegation could not convince the national government
to impose tariffs on Canadian lobster. For the trade measures in
particular, the Maine lobster fishery fits in the fourth row in Figure
3, where the profit disconnect is narrow but the power disconnect
is wide because exogenous decision makers at the national level
were much more concerned about factors other than fisheries and
so ignored the lobbying by Maine lobstermen (Acheson 1997).
This “nesting” of the structural context aside, both strategies fit
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with expectations of fisher behavior, even though neither solved
the core problems of the period.  
Because marketing and protectionism were unsuccessful, even as
palliative measures, attention turned toward altering the size limit
for lobster to take advantage of the growing demand for medium-
sized lobsters. Again, the lobster industry responded by working
to alleviate the economic crisis without addressing the biological
state of the stocks, as would be expected based on the AC/SC
framework. Not everyone favored this approach, because the
lower minimum size might open U.S. markets to smaller Canadian
lobsters. Thus, the desire for exclusion of outsiders predicted in
Figure 4 ensured that lobstermen and other industry interests
were divided on the size limit question. This caused political
stalemate that did not last very long, in part due to political
entrepreneurship and in part due to the rapid escalation of
problem signals in the fishery. The industry needed a solution if
it was going to survive. Commissioner Crie provided them with
cogent arguments for the establishment of a double gauge law to
bring the stocks back at least cost to the industry (Acheson 1997).  
In this instance, Commissioner Crie took the lead in establishing
regulations that were at once economically beneficial for the
industry and were based on sound scientific advice. Believing that
a smaller size limit alone would be detrimental to the stocks and
therefore to the industry as a whole, he favored a double-gauge
limit. Following work by biologists in the late 1800s, Crie proposed
that there should be a maximum size limit in addition to the
reduced minimum size limit. This would protect the older adult
lobsters that produced the majority of new eggs each season as
well as juvenile lobsters that had not yet had a chance to spawn.
This approach was not well received when introduced by Crie but
he persistently lobbied the fishing industry and decision makers
alike. Finally, the legislature adopted the double-gauge law in 1933
(Acheson 1997).  
There is also evidence of additional conservation-oriented
response without direct leadership. During the 1930s, lobstermen
started to self-police the ban on private sales of berried lobsters,
i.e., selling these lobsters to anyone but the State of Maine, or sale
of lobsters marked as reproductive-aged females. Sales of berried
lobster to the State of Maine for conservation were substantial in
this period (60,000 lbs per year) and because the government paid
market price this can be thought of as an industry support
program as well as a conservation program. Indeed, it is highly
expedient from the industry viewpoint because it is designed to
conserve the resource and actually benefits pound owners and the
lobstermen who supply them. Given that demand was low and
costs were high, this extra source of income was important to the
industry as a whole. Acheson and Gardener (2010) also point to
the economic hardships of the time as drivers of a search for better
management that would help to rebuild the stock, though they
focus on declines in catch rates in their 2011 piece on protection
of reproductive females via the V-notch law. It is likely that both
problem signals were important, though catch per unit effort
declined steadily in the early 1900s, and other signs of decline
were clearly visible to lobstermen early in the century, so it is likely
that the sudden narrowing of the profit disconnect was an
important component in this shift (Commissioners on Fish and
Game 1911).  
Thus, both the double gauge law and pre-existing laws protecting
reproductive female lobsters were either implemented or finally
enforced during this period of narrow profit disconnect.
Although this is an example of extremely delayed response when
the depth of the overfishing problem is considered, it is
exceptionally rapid when measured from the shift in the profit
disconnect created by the Great Depression. Compared to the
beginning of the 19th century, clear problem signals were received
by fishers and response, although still not proactive, rapidly
transitioned from pure exclusion and expansion to some level of
conservation. Although this change in the profit disconnect
created a window of opportunity, response may have taken a bit
more time if  not for several factors that made the double gauge
law and related protections for reproductive females more
expedient. These include the presence of a strong leader,
Commissioner Crie, and the fact that legislation protecting the
breeding stock already existed. However, these laws had existed
for decades and Crie himself, along with several other decision
makers, had worked to implement a license system and other
conservation measures since the end of World War I, yet it was
not until the profit disconnect closed that the industry finally
accepted the need for some type of conservation (Morris 2008).
When stocks and prices both started to rebound toward the end
of the decade, this visual proof of the efficacy of these measures
generated what Acheson (1997) calls a “conservation ethic,” or at
least a deep belief  that the double gauge and other measures that
were implemented during this period were absolutely necessary
for the continued prosperity of the fishery.
Late 1930s through early 1960s
It is difficult to determine the state of the profit disconnect during
World War II. Prices rose sharply with the increased demand due
to the war but stocks had also rebounded, so problem signals were
minimized. Furthermore, overcapitalization was alleviated by the
exit of numerous lobstermen during the Great Depression and
the departure of many young fishers who enlisted for the war.
Lower competition, higher stock sizes, and improved technologies
lead to a decline in costs of production, which amplified profits
even further but again, entry was limited by war-time shortages
of fuel, labor, and other resources, as well as fears of German U-
boats. By the end of the war the lobster stock was substantially
recovered, retail prices were high, and returning veterans swelled
the ranks of lobstermen. Indeed, the number of lobstermen nearly
doubled from 1940 to 1955, and then doubled again from 1955
to 1965. This would suggest a wide profit disconnect but landings
stagnated, high retail prices were not matched by high ex-vessel
prices (the amount paid to fishers), and costs of production were
also increasing in this period, so for lobstermen the profit
disconnect was still narrow (Formisano 1997). Economic power
was clearly in the hands of the dealers for much of the period,
but lobstermen could still wield the latent power of public opinion
if  they could overcome transaction costs and organize politically.
From this, we can say that the fishery remained within box 1 of
Figure 4.  
The only conservation-oriented measure passed in this period was
the 1948 V-notch law. This altered the manner of marking berried
female lobsters from a hole to a V-shaped notch in the tail and
codified the existing informal norm among fishers, who had
started voluntarily marking these lobsters in the late 1930s.
Although the government program to purchase berried females
remained in place throughout this period, it was scaled back
considerably and lobstermen caught more berried females than
the state could buy (Lobster Research Project 1974). Instead of
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scraping off  the eggs and selling the lobster illegally, as they had
in the past, a number of fishers started to mark these lobsters and
then return them to the ocean, increasing the number of lobsters
protected by law. Returning veterans in particular took up this
practice and internalized this norm during the 1940s. Therefore,
even though formal conservation-oriented legislation was
minimal during this period, the continued narrow profit
disconnect for lobstermen did reinforce the “conservation ethic”
that started during the Great Depression (Acheson and Gardner
2011). This informal response conforms to the early conservation
expectation derived from the AC/SC framework, though it should
be noted that bioeconomic problem signals were relatively week
until the late 1960s.  
In contrast, there was more conflict in this period than would be
expected from Figure 4. Of course, collective action remained in
place, so conflicts over fishing grounds were minimal, but the
economic divide between dealers and fishers led to significant
conflict over prices. Since the entry of well-smacks in the 1800s,
dealers had a certain amount of economic power over fishers.
They provided much of the capital that fishers used to purchase
new vessels and gear and many worked out informal agreements
with fishers to ensure a steady supply (and guaranteed purchase
price for the fisher). This dynamic increased drastically with the
formation of the joint U.S.-Canadian North Atlantic Lobster
Institute, a dealer consortium that formed during the war. By the
1950s, lobstermen started to organize to break dealer controls on
prices, forming the Maine Lobstermen’s Association (MLA) in
1954. Exceptionally low ex-vessel prices drove Maine lobstermen
to tie up their boats in protest for a week in 1956 and this was just
the start of a prolonged struggle for market control that included
the development of fishers co-operatives to compete with dealers
and a court case against MLA leaders, who were charged with
price-fixing because they instigated the tie up. The court ruled
against the MLA but penalties were minimal and the growth of
five new lobster co-operatives helped to break dealer control over
prices by the early 1970s (Acheson 1988, Formisano 1997).
Late 1960s through 1970s
Several changes in the lobster industry that started in the 1950s
substantially altered the profit/power dynamics by the end of the
1960s. Shifts in market structure described above allowed ex-vessel
prices to rise substantially. This trend was compounded by
continued growth in demand for lobsters generally and the
introduction of new technologies that helped to reduce costs of
production. Thus, the profit disconnect increased rapidly in this
period. At the same time increasing entry and diversification in
the fishery eroded historical systems of access rights that had
limited effort in the past (Acheson 1975). On the other hand, the
distribution of power became more uniform because fishers were
now well-organized politically and economically, even when
compared to dealers. This places the fishery in the upper right
box of Figure 4, where we expect prolonged conflict over access
rights and delayed conservation measures.  
In his famous work, Acheson (1988) describes the 1970s as a
period of constant conflict over management. There was
agreement that the stock was declining and that effort was much
too high, both economically and biologically, but no agreement
on which group of fishers should cut back. Lobstermen who
worked year-round wanted to ban “part-timers” and recreational
fishers, who of course defended their access rights. Thus, exclusion
was hotly debated but the only actual steps taken prohibited entry
by a new type of lobster fishing that was expanding rapidly in
states south of Maine: “dragging” for lobster. This method was
highly efficient for offshore production because the dragged gear
could cover more ground in areas where lobster tended to be
spread out. As such, it was also a major threat to the numerous
small-scale lobstermen of Maine, who lobbied vociferously to
keep the gear out of the state. They were successful in 1977 (Maine
Revised Statutes [date unknown], Schreiber 2007). As noted
above, exclusion of outside groups is an exception in the
expectations for this category. On the other hand, the same
legislation also created a licensing system for the lobster fishery.
This was a case of vertical interaction, as a federal law, the
Magnuson Act required improved licensing and data collection
in all U.S. fisheries within the newly created 200-mile Exclusive
Economic Zone.[3] Licenses were not limited so this is not a
conservation-oriented regulation, though it did serve as a
precursor for later legislation (NOAA 1983).  
Although many were recommended, only one conservation-
oriented law was passed in this period. In 1974, the legislature
agreed to require escape vents to allow undersized lobster to exit
traps. This bill was advertised as a cost-saving measure, because
large numbers of undersized lobster were being caught and
thrown back, taking considerable time and effort in what was still
a labor intensive industry (Krous 1977). Adoption of such an
expedient law that was supported by existing institutions is not
surprising given the responsive governance paradigm. Scientists
also recommended changes to the double gauge law to allow more
female lobsters to reach reproductive age in the 1970s. They
argued that this would negate the need for the V-notch law and
would in fact protect more females of reproductive age (Lobster
Research Project 1974). However, as Acheson and Gardner (2010)
point out, fishers were extremely reluctant to accept changes to
existing institutions, which they firmly believed were responsible
for bioeconomic resurgence of the fishery after World War II.
Certainly, these institutions had considerable staying power, and
are still followed today, but the prolonged conflict and lack of a
change in existing governance is also predicted by the AC/SC
framework; there simply was not enough impetuous in the period
to overcome conflict and agree on conservation measures because
the power disconnect and the profit disconnect were both
increasing.
1980s and 1990s
Yet again, exogenous changes altered the profit/power dynamic
in the 1980s. Higher costs of production and increased
competition from imported lobster drove profits down rapidly.
The disappearance of lobster from near shore fisheries forced
many “river” lobstermen to invest in larger vessels and move off
shore. At the same time, closure of other fisheries in the region
sent a surge of new entrants into the lobster fishery, substantially
increasing competition and magnifying incentives for exclusion
(Acheson 1988). Nevertheless, power was still distributed fairly
evenly among groups and so the fishery moves from box 2 to box
1, and the expectation is for collective action to solve conflicts
among fishers and relatively early conservation measures. In this
case the predictive capacity of Figure 4 starts to break down,
largely because these expectations were derived based on a simple
CPR model and did not consider the effects of constant switching
Ecology and Society 20(1): 33
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss1/art33/
between categories. In particular, the high level of
overexploitation and increasing demands on the resource by new
entrants greatly undermined collective action regimes rather than
reinforcing them. The result was a period of conflict and stalemate
similar to the expectations described in box 2 where the profit/
power disconnects are wide and distribution of power is relatively
uniform.  
The conflict of the 1970s continued into the 1980s in spite of the
narrowing profit disconnect. It is difficult to compare changes in
the profit disconnect over time, but part of the problem may be
that even though narrower than in the 1970s, it was still not nearly
as devastating to the industry as the sudden drops in demand seen
in previous periods of low profitability. Indeed, the presence of
new entrants suggests that there was still some disconnect and the
bioeconomic problem signals were only moderate, even if  some
long-time lobstermen left the industry because they did not like
changes in the fishing culture (Acheson 1988). What is certain is
that exclusion and control over access was very important in this
period and that lobstermen believed that their pre-existing
conservation practices should be sufficient if  they could control
entry and distribute the catch more evenly among remaining
fishers. It is also important to note that the federal government
played a more important role in this period. A lobster
management plan for all of New England was proposed in the
early 1980s. In included many regulations that were already
enacted by the State of Maine but several key components were
different, notably the higher minimum size limit described above,
ending of the V-notch practice, and removal of the upper limit in
the double gauge law (NOAA 1983, Acheson 1997). Although the
MLA appeared to compromise on this law in 1986, accepting a
higher minimum size with retention of the V-notch and maximum
gauge, they almost immediately reversed their position on the
minimum size, which was overturned the next year. For a short
while at least, Maine fishers were the only lobstermen allowed to
harvest smaller lobsters, which is in a way a form of exclusion,
though whether this was the MLA’s intention cannot be proved.
The effective exclusion of their fishers certainly angered other
states, and the federal government was not pleased by the rapid
policy reversal, but ultimately the new size limit was abandoned
in the New England management plan (Acheson 1997).  
By the 1990s, the desire to exclude outsiders and limit effort was
even higher than in the 1970s and 1980s, largely because
bioeconomic problem signals like trap congestion, lower catch
per effort (and related higher costs), and lower prices all escalated
over the period. In 1994, the MLA introduced a comprehensive
plan to limit effort in federal waters, including a moratorium on
entry for two years, but they did not have sufficient influence with
the Fisheries Management Council to push this through,
particularly when other states were still growing their offshore
lobster fleets. Within Maine, however, the constant lobbying over
access rights finally culminated in the passage of a zonal
management program that would give power to exclude back to
local councils. The powers wielded by these bodies, elected by
licensed lobstermen, not the public, included limits on the
maximum number of traps, the number of traps per string, and
time area closures of the fishery (Acheson 1997). Although trap
limits might be seen as conservation measure, overcapitalization
was exceptionally high in this period and reducing the number of
traps was not expected to reduce harvests overall. Rather, the goal
was to reduce costs and to place a cap on a small number of fishers
who employed more than their “fair share” of traps. As early as
1979, it was clear that increasing the number of traps was simply
reducing the number of lobsters per trap. Furthermore, although
most fishers fished less than 500 traps, about 20% fished more,
including about 10% fishing on 700-1000 traps. In addition,
Canada had already implemented zonal trap limits quite
successfully and this new program was seen as a way to increase
competitiveness against a rising tide of Canadian imports
(Lobster Research Program 1979).  
Interestingly, the idea for this program did not come from the
industry directly but was internally generated by the Marine
Resources Committee of the Maine Legislature to reduce conflict
among fishers that had lasted for many decades. However, with
this change in the structural context, lobstermen did exercise their
right to exclude, with most zones limiting the number of traps to
600-800 within a few years (Acheson and Gardner 2010). This
supports the institutional perspective that collective action at the
local level requires support from formal institutions at state or
regional levels, although by this time most of the old “harbor
gangs” of Maine were gone, except in the “down east” region
(Ostrom 1990, Billings 2014). Nevertheless, we do see lobstermen
clinging to existing conservation measures and working
strenuously to exclude outsiders in this period. The structural
context just did not favor collective action in its classic form. This
suggests a need to amend the expectations for box 1 in Figure 4
to take better account of structural realities.
2000s to date
By the end of the 20th century, exogenous forces, notably the
collapse of groundfish stocks like cod, allowed the sustainable
level of lobster production to increase substantially (Zhang et al.
2012). However, the open access level of production and nominal
prices for lobster also increased significantly.[4] As would be
expected, a steep increase in landings without concomitant
growth of demand led to declining real prices in the 2000s and,
in spite of the relatively wide profit disconnect and relatively
healthy stocks, lobstermen started to experience negative price
signals in the 2000s (Schreiber 2013). One response to this signal
was the development of community supported fishery programs
to boost local demand and secure a stable revenue stream.
Another was ratcheting up of exclusion under the existing Zone
Management Law. Conflict among fishers over access increased
again when the profit disconnect narrowed with the recession of
2008. Interestingly, capital-rich fishing interests chose to push for
a removal of the ban on use of draggers to catch lobsters around
this time. Offshore fishers in particular would like permission to
use these more effective gears to take advantage of the higher
stock size. This would, of course, further increase production and
could dampen prices if  demand does not rebound more rapidly
but it could also start a reinforcing feedback loop, allowing
offshore fleets to increase in profitability and political power and
shifting the system back into box 4 of Figure 4, where all of the
hard-won conservation ethic of the last century would be eaten
away. In either case, this law would be crippling for inshore fishers
using single-line traps and so far their opposition has prevented
this change in legislation (Marine Resources Committee 2007,
Schreiber 2007).  
Meanwhile, ecologists warn fishers and decision makers alike that
lobster is caught in a “gilded trap” created by heavy reliance on
just a few species, and that the current wealth of lobsters could
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easily be tipped across a threshold causing the stock, and the
ecosystem, to collapse. These concerns are heightened by
oceanographic shifts associated with climate change and there
appears to be a clear need for precaution in the face of high
uncertainty regarding future environmental conditions (Steneck
et al. 2011). Nevertheless, catches continue to increase to record
levels every year and fishers remain convinced that their age-old
practices will sustain the stock and that managing effort,
particularly through exclusion of outsiders and “equitable”
distribution among insiders via trap and gear limits, is all that is
needed to grapple with the ongoing crisis of demand. If  the
lobstermen are correct, then their future is secure, but if  the
scientists are right then continued responsive governance will lead
to severe crisis in the near future. Ultimately, this is the case for
all ecological problems that are not signaled by economic costs.
DISCUSSION
As a predictive tool, the power/profit dynamics that were derived
from the AC/SC framework work fairly well. Expectations
described in Figure 4 were met in almost all of the time periods
covered in the lobster case. Some amendment of these
expectations to include initial conditions and existing institutions
is indicated, particularly by the divergence from the collective
action expectation in the 1980s-1990s period. Expected exogenous
and endogenous sources of transition between profit/power
categories were also observed throughout the case study, though
no attempt was made to predict specific sources of change in
particular periods. Clearly, developing better data sets that allow
for more rigorous comparison of the state of the profit disconnect
and bioeconomic problem signals over time is also important
because there does appear to be some difference in response
between periods of extreme change in the profit disconnect and
related signals, i.e., the Great Depression, and smaller, more
gradual shifts observed in later periods. Nevertheless, accounting
for both power and profit disconnects does provide considerable
insight into the long history of management in this iconic fishery.  
Perhaps most important, the case above explains both stability
and change in the lobster fishery using a unified framework. It
shows how changing incentives lead to bursts of management that
have lasting effects even in periods when increasing profits and/
or prolonged conflict prevent new action from taking place. It
also highlights interactions between exclusionary response and
conservation response, narrowing the gap between institutionalists
like Acheson (1988, 1997) and political ecologists like Brewer and
Brewer (2012) who point out the distributional effects of lobster
governance. A third key contribution is the identification of long-
term cycling of governance between the two cycles presented in
Figure 1. Webster (2015) refers to this as the management
treadmill. For over 200 years, governance of the lobster fishery
shifted back and forth between effective and ineffective periods
of management. Although the “conservation ethic” described by
Acheson persisted throughout multiple cycles it did not prevent
exogenous shifts that led to periods of increasing bioeconomic
problems. Furthermore, the frequency of these shifts increased
over time. With the exception of the Great Depression, early
management periods lasted 3-4 decades but by the middle of the
20th century shifts occurred every 10-20 years. This escalation can
be traced to exogenous growth in demand for lobster, which
increasingly undermined governance institutions that were
developed to minimize conflict among fishers and conserve the
resource. This suggests that we may need to look beyond fisheries
management to build sustainable fisheries.  
Although the insights above are important, clearly more testing
and refinement is needed for this approach. First, within the area
of fisheries research, it is important to show that the profit/power
dynamics described in Figure 4 are widely applicable in other
fisheries where noncommercial and exogenous actors have little
influence. It is also necessary to analyze the broader implications
of the AC/SC framework described in Figure 3 by compiling
additional case studies in fisheries where noncommercial and
exogenous actors do wield political power. Systematic study of
endogenous and exogenous factors that switch fisheries from one
profit/power category to another would also be useful. Second,
similar studies in other issues areas will help to establish the
generalizability of the AC/SC framework and related expectations
regarding profit/power dynamics and governance response. This
may require additional theoretical work, particularly for areas
where the common pool resource driver is absent. However, given
that exogenous drivers like growing demand and globalization
affect all resource industries, application to private property
systems is clearly essential. Finally, in all new work it is important
to find ways to quantify key variables, particularly the profit
disconnect and bioeconomic problem signals so that more
detailed comparisons can be made across time. This will be very
difficult in fisheries because cost data are not often provided by
fishers but it may be feasible in other areas.
CONCLUSION
The analysis above supports the AC/SC Framework as a useful
approach to holistic understanding of fisheries management
issues. In fact, the conclusions presented here are encapsulated in
the logic of the framework itself. The framework shows that, while
governance is problem driven, it may be heavily dependent on
human perceptions of specific signals and their relative positions
of power. This is what makes the profit and power disconnects
such important predictors of response. In this, response can be
facilitated by structural factors as described in much of the
existing literature but it is also necessary to watch for those
windows of opportunity created by changing incentives and
power structures. Management response will be most adaptive
when the action cycle aligns with favorable structural conditions,
sending strong signals to powerful parties at times when the most
expedient response is also perceived to be effective, shoring up
governance over the long run. Response will be stagnant or
ineffective when signals are dampened by structural factors,
particularly economic changes that widen the profit disconnect
or political dynamics that generate prolonged conflict.  
Most important, the AC/SC framework predicts and the case
study demonstrates that environmental governance is a chronic
problem. Management and other informal governance
institutions tend to cycle through effective and ineffective periods,
with switching driven by both endogenous and exogenous factors.
Over the last century, drivers of this cycle have been increasing
and so the treadmill is speeding up. This does not just mean that
problems arise more quickly but also that they tend to be more
severe. In the lobster case, this pattern was mitigated over the last
few decades because of an exogenous environmental shift that
increased lobster productivity, but the opposite behavior has also
been observed in many fisheries. As the management treadmill
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speeds up, stocks are pushed closer and closer to ecological
thresholds and bioeconomic collapse. The same is true in many
other environmental issue areas and there is a clear argument here
to at once accept the chronic nature of the governance problem
and also look to the exogenous forces that drive the management
treadmill.
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